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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTIIORITY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ISLAND RANCHING COMP ANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10395 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is brought before the Court on Inter-
locutory Appeal under the provisions of Rule 72 ( b) , 
Utah Hules of Civil Procedure. The action is one in 
eminent domain, initiated by the Respondent to acquire 
properties of the Appellant. The Appeal raises issues 
of law questioning the constitutional validity of Title 
fl.5, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
establishing the Great Salt Lake Authority as well as 
the Authority's power to condemn the lands of Appel-
lant. 
1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The trial Court entered an Order denying Island 
Ranching Company's lVIotion to dismiss the Complaint 
in condemnation of GSLA for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted on May 26, 1965. 
The Complaint was dismissed on all counts. On the 
same date, the lower Court also granted Appellant an 
extension of time in which to respond to the Complaint 
so as to permit Appellant to file a petition for inter-
locutory appeal with this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Order of the trial Court denying Appellant's 
~lotion to dismiss the Complaint of the Great Salt Lake 
Authority should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts as accurate and correct the 
Statement of Facts contained in Appellant's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
GSLA'S COMPLAINT WAS A PROPER TEST 
OF THE COMPLAINT'S LEGAL SUFFICl 
ENCY. 
2 
The above point is accepted as correct by Respond-
ent and is not contested in this brief. 
POINT II 
THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF 
GSLA'S PO-\VER AS STATED IN THE ACT 
IS CAP ABLE OF DEFINITION AND THE 
ACT CANNOT BE DECLARED UNCONSTI-
TGTION ALLY INVALID ON THAT BASIS. 
The appellant states that Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, is invalid and unenforceable for 
failure to adequately define the territorial jurisdiction 
of the power of the Great Salt Lake Authority. 
( 1) The title to the Act establishing the Great 
Salt Lake Authority is a valid source of leg-
islative intent for the purpose of resolving 
ambiguities within the body of the Act. 
Section 65-8-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, defines the purpose of the Act as the develop-
rnent of the "Great Salt Lake and its environs," which 
appellant asserts is an inadequate delineation of terri-
torial jurisdiction. 
If the phrase can be said to be ambiguous, it is a 
\\'ell recognized principle of statutory construction that 
courts can seek interpretive guidance from sources 
n:trinsic to the actual body of the statute. Sutherland, 
St11t utor.lJ Construction, Section 4506, 3rd ed. 
3 
A primary aid, extrinsic to the statutory provisions, 
in determining the legislative intent is the title of th: 
statute. 
"In short, in ascertaining the intention of the 
legislature nothing is to be rejected whid1 will 
assist in the clarification of ambiguous phrases 
and where the title throws light on the meanin()' 
of the statute itself, it is an available tool for th~ 
resolution of the doubt." Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction, Section 4802, 3rd ed. 
In Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distribut-
ing Corp., 2. U. 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954), this 
Court stated its view of the statute's title as an aid to 
construction: where a statute is ambiguous, it is " ... 
permissible to consider the title of the statute, which 
admittedly is no part of its actual context, to shed light 
on its meaning." (P. 183, 272 P.2d). The Court cited 
the above quoted portion of Sutherland, Statutory Con-
struction, in support of its opinion. 
The principle quoted above from the Utah decision 
and Sutherland, supra, is widely accepted in other juris-
dictions including the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore 
& Ohio Railroad Co., 331 U.S. 519, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 
L.Ed. 1646 (1946). 
State courts have generally adopted the same view. 
The Montana Court has held that the title may be lookc~ 
to in determining legislative intent. In Re Coleman.i· 
Estate, Mont., 132 J\ilont. 339, 317 P.2d 880 (1957). 
The California Court has on several occasions heltl 
4 
that the title of an act may be relied upon when attempt-
ing to ascertain legislative intent: that the title may 
guide the Court in determining the " ... intended scope 
of legislation", People v. Tawney , 168 C.A.2d 599, 
366 P.2d 659, 668 (1959); Lawton v. Board of Medi-
cal Examiners ,147 C.A.2d 256, 299 P.2d 362 (1956), 
in support of the general proposition stated. 
Appellant's statement that the jurisdictional and 
constitutional requirements of a statute cannot be sup-
plied by the title is irrelevant, misleading, and unsup-
ported by the authorities he cites. (P. 13, Appellant's 
Brief). The respondent is not arguing that the title 
of an act is part of the "law", nor that the title should 
supply necessary elements that are totally lacking in 
the statute. The argument is only that the title of a 
statute can properly be looked to in determining legis-
lative intent as to those existing elements which are 
indefiinite, uncertain or ambiguous. 
The decisions do not distinguish the types of ambi-
guities which can be resolved by looking to the title 
of the statute. The Utah Court in Donahue, supra, 
utilized the title to a statute in question to resolve 
an ambiguity in favor of a result which avoided invali-
dating the statute as unconstitutional. Several decisions 
l1ave utilized the statutory title to determine the intended 
Sl'ripe of the statute as to persons affected and territory 
involved. Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 
108 P.2d 646 (1949); Police Pension Board of City 
:i( Phoenix v. Warren, 97 Ariz. 180, 398 P.2d 892 
5 
(1965); l(idder v. Nelwma Lumber Co., 196 Ore. 409, 
249 P.2d 754 (1952). 
The title of the Act establishing the Great Sali 
Lake Authority, Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, furnishes a detailed geographi-
cal description of the territory the Legislature intended 
to be included within the phrase "Great Salt Lake and 
its environs." The title to the Statute reads in part: "An 
act relating to the development of all of the mainland, 
islands, minerals and water within the Great Salt Lake 
meander line established by the United States surveyor 
general;". (Emphasis added). 
(2) The surveyed meander line adequately de-
lineates the territorial jurisdiction of GS-
LA. 
Appellant has argued that the United States Sur-
veyor General has never completed a survey of the lake, 
and that a legislative reference to such a surveyed 
meander line is therefore an inadequate description of 
territorial jurisdiction. Since there is nothing in the 
record to support this assertion, appellant cites a memo-
randum filed by the Utah Attorney General in a con-
gressional hearing on Senate Bill 265. 
As this Court judicially knows, Great Salt Lake 
has been surveyed as to its meander line on a piece-meal 
basis, with the survey of each segment being separately 
approved by the United States Surveyor General and 
accordingly platted on Federal and State land records. 
6 
At the present time certain areas on the west side of 
the lake remain unsurveyed. 
The entire argument of appellant as to this point 
is inadequate because: 
(a) There is nothing in the record to show that the 
surveyed meander is not an adequate territorial 
guide; 
(b) GSLA is not attempting and has not attempt-
ed to exercise any jurisdiction m any unsur-
veyed area of the lake; 
( c) The Court can sustain the reference to the 
surveyed meander as a territorial delineatim1, 
and judicially limit the GSLA to those areas 
of the lake where the meander has been sur-
veyed; 
( d) In the nature of the situation, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the Legislature 
to find a better definition of territorial juris-
diction than the lake and its environs situated 
within the surveyed meander. 
The uncertainty of the phrase "Great Salt Lake 
and its environs" as used in the body of the Act can 
e easily be resolved by reference to the title, which con-
tains a statement of the territory the Legislature in-
\" tended the Great Salt Lake Authority to have within 
11 its .iurisdiction, and consideration of that title by this 
'· l'ourt will quickly eliminate any question of invalidating 
7 
the Act on the basis of failure to define territorial juris-
diction. 
POINT III 
THE ACT ESTABLISHING THE GREAT 
SALT LAKE AUTHORITY IS NOT VULNER-
ABLE TO ATTACK AS AN UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE 
AUTHORITY TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
BODY. 
Appellant claims that the Legislature has con-
ferred upon the Great Salt Lake Authority unlimited 
discretion in the exercise of its statutory powers. It 
is clear that courts will not permit a legislature so to 
empower an administrative body. It is equally clear 
that the Legislature did not so empower the Great 
Salt Lake Authority. 
( 1) The more recent state court decisions de-
termine the validity of a legislative delega· 
tion of power upon the adequacy of the 
stated legislative policy and the sufficiency 
of protection of the interests affected. 
Courts have long recognized the necessity of dele· 
gation of certain powers by the legislature to adminis· 
trative bodies. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co v. Adkins, 
310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940). 
But this recognition has traditionally been coupled with 
a suspicion that delegation of power to the administ:n-
tive body by the legislature may result in usurpatio:i 
8 
by the administrative body of powers which are exclu-
sive to the legislature. This suspicious attitude has 
produced such statements as the following: "That the 
legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, 
of course, clear." United States v. Shreveport Grain 
& Elevator Co., 282 U.S. 3ll, 324, 51 S.Ct. 159, IG2, 
75 L.Ed. 359 ( 1931). Despite these rather definite 
mbalizations, no congressional delegation to an ad-
ministrative agency which has been regularly consti-
tuted has ever been held invalid by the United States 
Supreme Court. Davis, (Adrninistrative Law Treatise,) 
Section 2.01 (1958). 
It is conceded that the state courts have previously 
adhered more zealously to the above stated policies of 
the Supreme Court than has the Supreme Court itself. 
In recent years, however, the decisions indicate a liberal-
izing trend in the attitude of state courts toward the 
delegation of power by the legislature to administrative 
bodies. 
A brief consideration of Utah decisions as well as 
decisions from several of our sister jurisdictions will 
illustrate those factors which state courts deem primarily 
persuasive when reviewing a legislative delegation of 
power. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared legislative 
delegations of power invalid in two major decisions. 
Pnion Trust v. Simmons, ll6 Utah 422, 2ll P.2d 190 
l.1949) ; Revne v. Trade Commission, ll3 Utah 155, 
ln2 P .2d 563 ( 1948) . The factor which persuaded the 
9 
Court to hold the delegation unconstitutionally invafol 
is identical in both cases. 
The Court in Revnc, supra, articulated with great 
specificity the defects in the Barbers' Price and Hour 
Act, which rendered several of its sections invalid, and 
emphasized that: 
"The board is not given power to act for the 
public upon its own initiative. Thus the public 
interest is subjected to the interests of a grou~ 
who may be very antagonistic to that public 
interest. * * * We believe this act is not properly 
confined to the public interest." (P. 568, 192 
P.2d). 
The language of this Court in Union Trust Co., supra, 
is strikingly similar: 
"Thus, the operation of the law is not con· 
tingent primarily upon the determination of pub-
lic convenience and advantage by proper admin· 
istrative authority, but is primarily contingent 
upon the whim and caprice of competitors ... " 
(P.192, 211 P.2d). 
The Union Trust Co. decision quoted the language 
in Revne, supra, relating to the delegation of power by 
the legislature, thus indicating approval by the Court 
of the principles stated therein, and concluding: 
"'Ve recognize, of course, that the legislah~re 
may properly delegate to some administratirc 
body the duty of ascertaining the facts u~on 
which the provisions of a law are to functwn 
... " (P.567, 192 P.2d). (Emphasis added). 
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This Court in Clayton v. Bennett, 3 U.2d 152, 
298 P.2d 531 (1956), quoted the judicial policy earlier 
framed in Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 
Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1, 3 ( 1940), indicating a reasonably 
liberal view toward the delegation by the legislature 
of power to administrative bodies: 
"That the legislature may not surrender or 
delegate its legislative power is demental. It 
may, however, provide for the execution through 
administrative agencies of its legislative policy 
and may confer upon such administrative officers 
certain powers and the duty of determining the 
question of the existence of certain facts upon 
which the effect or execution of its legislative 
policy may be dependent." (Emphasis added). 
The Court then stressed the importance of an element 
' which has recently been recognized by many courts as 
essential to a valid legislative delegation of power to 
HU administrative agency-procedural safeguards for 
those who are affected by the actions of that body. 
"If they [agency members} should fail to reg-
ularly pursue their authority, or refuse to do so, 
or act in any manner which is arbitrary, capri-
cious or discriminatory ... , recourse to the 
courts is available." (P.536, 298 P.2d). 
The above cited Utah decisions permit formulation 
of those factors which exert the most persuasive force 
Upon this Court in its determination of the constitutional 
adequacy of a delegation of power by the legislature 
lo an administrative body. Any statute purporting to 
s() delegate must contain an ascertainable legislative 
11 
policy, which will guide the administrative body in its 
consideration of facts when implementing the policy, 
as well as protection of the public and private interests 
involved through effective procedural safeguards pro-
vided by the statute in question. 
The significance of the above enumerated elements 
has been emphasized by the courts of other jurisdictions 
The California Supreme Court, speaking through J us-
tice Traynor, analyzed the insistence upon legislative 
"standards" as a result of the judicial desire to insure 
the protection of the public interest, and adopted the 
view that "standards" and "safeguards" are synony-
mous as to function. 
"The absence of such standards, or safeguards 
. . . , renders effective review of the exercise of 
delegated power impossible. * * * Delegated 
power must be accompanied by suitable safe· 
guards to guide its use and to protect against its 
misuse." Blumenthal v. Board of Medical E:r· 
aminers, 57 C.2d 228, 368 P.2d 101, 105 (1962). 
The Arizona Court in Schecter v .Killingsworth, 93 
Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963), stated its continue<l 
reliance upon the criteria of validity of legislative dele· 
gation of power to administrative bodies formulate<l 
by it in one of its ear lier decisions (Southwest En,qineer· 
ing Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764, 772, 775 
(1955)): 
"We note also a distinct modern tendency !0 
be more liberal in the granting of discretion in 
the administration of laws in fields where the 
complexities of economic and governmental con· 
12 
ditions have increased, particularly where it is 
impractical to lay down a comprehensive rule. 
* * * If the law provides a defined course of 
conduct upon the occurrence or determination of 
a particular condition or state of facts, even 
though that determination is dependent upon an 
evaluation in the nature of a deduction from 
facts, there is neither an unconstitutional dele-
gation of power nor is the act so indefinite and 
uncertain that it can be held to be invalid." (P. 
144, 380 P.2d). (Emphasis added). 
The Arizona Court in the Schecter opinion was strongly 
persuaded by the existence of " ... adequate provision 
for judicial review ... " in ruling in favor of the con-
stitutional validity of the delegation of power by the 
legislature. (See P. 144, 380 P.2d). 
A recent decision of the California Supreme Court 
is particularly in point. The Justices were unanimous 
in upholding the validity of a legislative delegation 
of power to an administrative agency which was estab-
lished for the accomplishment of purposes substantially 
similar to those for which the Great Salt Lake Authority 
was established. In Re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal 
Project lB, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538 (1964). 
The Court reviewed an agency which had been created 
for the purposes of designating areas in Los Angeles 
for development and formulating plans for said de-
velopment. The Court was realistically cognizant of 
the situation motivating the legislature to create such 
an agency and the effect that such legislative motivation 
should properly have on the court's judgment. 
13 
"It appears to us likewise that the scope of 
permissJble delegatio~ of power to the agency 
should be measured m terms of the complexity 
and diversity of the conditions which will be e~­
countered' in the performance of the final plan." 
(P. 558, 559, 389 P.2d). 
In the same decision, the Court expressed its attitude 
toward the relationship between a legislative body and 
an administrative body: 
"The essentials of the legislative function are 
the determination and formulation of the legis-
lative policy. Generally speaking, attainment of 
the ends, including how and by what means they 
are to be achieved, may constitutionally be left 
in the hands of others." (P. 564, 389 P.2d). 
This Court, in the instant appeal, is faced with a situa-
tion identical to the situation before the California 
Court in the above case. 
(2) The Statute establishing the Great Salt 
Lake Authority contains an adequately de· 
fined legislative policy and sufficient pro· 
cedural safeguards. 
The Legislature established the Great Salt Lake 
Authority for the purpose of development of the Great 
Salt Lake and its environs as expressed by Section 
65-8-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This 
Section is the initial statement of the Legislative policy. 
The remaining provisions of the Statute contain ample 
definition of the meaning of the word "development" in 
further delineation of the Legislative policy. 
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Section 65-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, establishes an Advisory Council to the Author-
ity. The following State departments and agencies are 
members of this Council: State Engineer, Tourist and 
Publicity Council, State Parks and Recreation Com-
mission, Fish and Game Commission, State Land Board, 
State Road Commission, State Water and Power 
Board. The conclusion is inevitable that these depart-
ments and agencies were chosen because the GSLA 
would be operating in areas wherein the special knowl-
edge of these sister agencies could be of assistance. 
Section 65-8-6 ( 5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, describes with specificity what the Legis-
lature means by "development". The Legislature has 
instructed the Authority to design plans and programs 
to coordinate the development of grazing areas, fish 
and game activities, mining and mineral removal, and 
natural resources-with emphasis on utilization of water 
resources, industrial activities, and recreational and 
tourist facilities. 
The result intended to be achieved by the Legis·· 
lature involves a program of operation too varied and 
complex to be effectively performed by the Legislature. 
The complexity of the intended program necessitated 
the creation of an administrative body. To require the 
Legislature to be meticulously specific in defining its 
policy is to substantially destroy the value of admin-
istrative agencies as vehicles for implementing broad 
legislative policy. 
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Section 65-8-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 a:> 
amended, expresses the necessity of creating an admin-
istrative body in the instant situation by requiring its 
members to be persons " ... who shall be selected be-
cause of their understanding of and demonstrated in-
terest in the development of the Great Salt Lake au<l 
its environs." (Emphasis added). The Legislature thus 
recognized its dependence upon the expertise of an 
administrative agency to achieve practical realization 
of a broad legislative policy-a policy which the Legis-
lature was able to formulate only as a statement of the 
result it desired to achieve. 
Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, satisfies the second major criterion of valid-
ity of a legislative delegation of power to an administra-
tive body by including provisions limiting the Author-
ity's discretion so as to protect the public and private 
interests. Throughout the Statute, the Legislature has 
specified that the activities of the Authority must be 
"reasonably" related to the accomplishment of the 
results desired to be achieved. The standard of "rea· 
sonableness" is susceptible to practical interpretation 
by the judiciary. 
The most substantial power delegated to the 
Authority, eminent domain, is subject to the provisions 
of Title 78, Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
(See Section 65-8-6 ( 7), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended). The procedural limitations imposed upon 




are more fully discussed in Point IV of this brief. The 
protection of public and private interests from arbi-
trary and discriminatory taking of property by the 
Authority is effectively provided for. 
In addition to the procedural safeguards mentioned 
above, the discretion of the Authority is circumscribed 
by Section 65-8-6 ( 1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. Acquisition of all real or personal property, 
in any manner authorized by the Statute, requires the 
approval of the Legislature. The credit of the State 
of Utah cannot be pledged without the consent of the 
Legislature, thereby allowing the Legislature to exer-
cise a very effective control upon the discretion of GSLA 
with regard to the acquisition of real and personal 
property. 
( 3) Appellant is not justified in asserting its 
ability to ascertain its position under the Act. 
A reading of the Act reveals that the Legislature 
intended Antelope Island to be included within the term 
"Great Salt Lake and its environs." Section 65-8-6 
(IO), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, em-
bodies a detailed legislative mandate to the Authority 
to initiate immediate action for the purpose of develop-
ing properties on Antelope Island as tourist and recrea-
tional attractions. The extent of the legislative grant 
of power to GSLA to enable it to obey this mandate is 
discussed in Point IV of this brief. 
The legislative intent with regard to the properties 
on Antelope Island is further revealed by Section 65-
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8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which 
states in part: 
"Within the limitations of available funds the 
state road commission is authorized to construct 
a road from the town of Syracuse to the north 
end of Antelope Island along with the necessal'\' 
roads on the island to serve the recreational dd-
velopment. These roads are to be located by the 
state road commission with approval of the au-
thority, and are to be programmed for design 
and construction upon the securing of Antelope 
Island property." (Emphasis added). 
The validity of the legislative delegation of power 
to the Great Salt Lake Authority must be decided with 
reference to the circumstances motivating the creation 
of GSLA by the Legislature. 
The Authority was established to accomplish the 
desire of the Legislature that the "Great Salt Lake 
and its environs" be developed to the maximum extent. 
Implementation of such a legislative policy contemplates 
a staggeringly complex program of operation. To 
require a precise statutory description of such a pro-
gram would unduly burden the Legislature. 
The Legislature has outlined for the Authority's 
guidance the purpose to be accomplished and the areas 
of operation for accomplishing that purpose. The Ad 
defines the methods of operation by enumeration °1 
GSLA's legal powers. The Legislature has conferred 
upon the Authority that amount of discretion <leerncr~ 
realistically necessary to successful implementation °1 
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the legislative policy. This discretion has been sufficient-
ly limited by procedural safeguards designed to protect 
the public and private interests involved, resulting in a 
balance which is acceptable to the courts. 
There is no basis upon which the delegation of 
power to GSLA can be held unconstitutionally invalid. 
POINT IV 
ANY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 
6.5-8-6(10), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 
AS Al\iIENDED, DENYING GSLA POWER TO 
I ACQUIRE PROPERTIES ON ANTELOPE 
' ISLAND BY EMINENT DOMAIN IS INCON-
SISTENT "\VITH THE CLEAR LEGISLA-
TIVE INTENT. 
The appellant relies upon several widely-respected 
canons of statutory construction discussed in detail 
below to support an interpretation of Section 65-8-6-
(10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which 
denies the Authority the power to acquire properties on 
Antelope Island by eminent domain. It must be empha-
sized, however, that the primary function of such canons 
is to aid the courts in ascertaining the intent of the 
Legislature. 
( 1) Canons of statutory interpretation will not 
be used to frustrate the intent of the Legis-
lature. 
The primary purpose of canons of statutory con-
struction is the determination of the legislative intent. 
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In determining the legislative intent, the Utah 
Supreme Court has generally placed primary emphasis 
upon an examination of the purpose of the legislation 
as expressed by the statute. "It is generally recognized 
that courts will give an act such a construction as will 
accomplish its purpose." Ralph Child Construction Cu. 
v. StateTax Commission, 12 U.2d 53, 58, 362 P.2d 
422, ( 1961). 
This Court in Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 
232 P.2d 766 ( 1951), stated that the primary rule of 
statutory construction is the ascertainment of the in-
tention of the Legislature in order that the intent can 
be effectively accomplished. 
A difficult problem of statutory construction arises 
when a provision of a statute is allegedly susceptible 
to more than one interpretation. The Utah Supreme 
Court has been practical in those instances in which 
it has faced this problem. In Driggs v. Utah State 
Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d 
657 ( 1943), it was stated that the statutory language 
must be interpreted to effectuate the purposes of the 
statute and " ... as between two possible construc-
tions, that one will be adopted which does so give effect 
to its purpose." (P. 633, 142 P.2d). In Conover v. 
Board of Education, 110 Utah 454, 175 P.2d 2~9. 
( 1946), this Court said: "It is settled law that an m-
terpretation which defeats any of the manifest purposes 
of the statute cannot be accepted." (P. 210, 175 P.2d). 
In Snyder v. Clune, 15 U.2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (196~) 
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the Court stated that results incongruous with the legis-
lative purposes are to be avoided. In Rowley v. Public 
Service Commission, 112 Utah 116, I85 P.2d 5I4, 
(1947), the Court held that legislatve intent will prevail 
over a literal interpretation, especially where the literal 
interpretation will yield an absurd result. In Maisch 
v. United States S'melting, Refining & Mining Co., 
113 Utah IOI, I9I P.2d 6I2, (I948), the Court said that, 
in addition to avoiding an interpretation that will result 
in confusion or uncertainty, the Court should adopt 
that construction which " ... will permit the officials 
having the responsibility for its administration to pro-
ceed in an orderly manner." (P. 620, I9I P.2d). 
The appellant, Island Ranching Company, main-
tains that a literal reading of Section 65-8-6 (IO), Utah 
Code Annotated, I953, would lead to the conclusion 
that the property on Antelope Island is immune from 
the power of eminent domain as exercised by the Great 
Salt Lake Authority. Appellant asserts that two fun-
damental rules of statutory construction, ejusdem 
generis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius, com-
pel an interpretation of the phrase "or other lawful 
means" contained in subsection (IO), which would limit 
the phrase to legal proceedings in which the consent 
of the parties involved is necessary because the specific 
Words, "donation", "purchase", etc., preceding the 
phrase "or other lawful means" limit that more general 
phrase to lawful means having the same common de-
nominator as the specific words, i.e. consent. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has said, however. that 
the rule of e.rpressio unius est e,rclusio alterius may not 
be used to defeat the apparent intent of the Legisl~ture. 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission. 
7 4 Utah 103, 277 Pac. 206, ( 1929). 
In regard to the use of the maxim ejusdem yencris 
the Colorado Court is in accord with the reasoning of 
the U tab Court: 
"The rule of ejusdem generis is resorted to 
merely as an aid of construction. If upon con-
sideration of the whole law upon the subject and 
the purposes to be effected, it is apparent the 
legislature intended the general words to go be-
yond the class specifically desi,qnated the rule 
does not apply." Martinez v. People, 137 P.~d 
690, 693 ( 1943). (Emphasis added). 
The language of Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, clearly reveals the purpose of the 
Statute to be development of the lake area to the great-
est degree possible. 
The Legislature revealed its awareness of GSLXs 
need for the power of eminent domain when it express])· 
granted that power for the purposes of acquiring real 
and personal property in furtherance of the purposei 
of the Statute. Section 65-8-6 (I), Utah Code Auno-
tated, 1953. No distinction 3,s to where the propert)· 
must be located is made, as long as it is within the "Gre:it 
Salt Lake and its environs." 
. . l . tJi·· 
The property on Antelope Island is w1t.i111 , . 
territorial jurisdiction of the Authority's powers. 1' lJ: 
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thermore, the Legislature specifically designated Ante-
lope Island as a primary target for "tourist and recre-
ational uses." Section 65-8-6 ( 10), Utah Code Anno-
, lated, 1953. Nevertheless, it is argued that despite the 
legislative intent revealed by consideration of the pre-
ceding paragraphs, the phrase empowering the Author-
ity to act with respect to the property on Antelope 
Island excludes the exercise by the Authority of the 
power of eminent domain to procure that property. 
It is submitted that the above argument is more 
1 than sufficient to show that a limitation of the phrase, 
"or other lawful means", Section 65-8-6 ( 10), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, by application of rules of statutory 
construction formulated by the courts to discover legis-
lative intent, would only frustrate the accomplishment 
of a legislative intent that is very clearly stated. 
This Court has itself stated a proper course of 
action when faced with statutory provisions which ap-
pear to be in conflict: 
"It is our duty in interpreting a statute to give 
effect to the legislative' intent as expressed by 
the wording of the statute. If reasonably pos-
sible, effect should be given to every part of a 
statute and if the enactment is subject to one or 
more interpretations by reason of conflicting pro-
visions then that construction which will har-
' monize and give effect to all provisions is pre-
f erred." Taft v. Glade, 201 P.2d 144, 285, 287, 
Utah 435 ( 1948). 
It is emphasized that Subsections ( l ) and ( l 0) 
of Section 65-8-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are not 
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in conflict, but the above quotation is simply in reply 
to appellant's erroneous assumption that said proYisiun, 
are in fact conflicting. If the phrase "or other lawful 
means" contained in Subsection ( 10) is read to include 
those means defined as "legal" in Subsection (I), i.e. 
purchases, gift, devise, eminent domain, etc., the alleued 
/'.') 
conflict would evaporate and effect would be giren tu 
all provisions of the Statute in accord with the stated 
legislative intent. 
( 2) The judicial policy of strict construction 
of statutes granting the power of eminent 
domain is not properly applicable to tbf 
GSLA Act. 
The appellant has presented case authority, 'rhich 
will be examined below, in support of the proposition 
that a statute delegating the power of eminent domain 
is to be strictly construed against that body which exer-
cises the power. The application of this principle in 
the manner proposed by appellant would be improper 
when one considers the guidelines set up for application 
of the principle and the general policy which has moti-
vated the courts in applying it. 
A case much relied on by appellant is Bertagnoli 
v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626 (1950). The Utah 
Supreme Court was determining the validity of an at· 
tempt by the Salt Lake City Board of Education tn 
· b · t d · t I · I "lS clearlr acqmre y emmen omam proper y w 11c 1 ", ·,. · 
outside the territorial boundaries of the Salt Lake Cit)' 
School District. Although invalidating this particular 
C · l tic prn attempt, the Utah SHpreme ourt recogrnze< 1 
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priety of case decisions which interpreted similar ex-
ercises of the power of eminent domain as authorized 
by dear implication of the statute granting the power, 
because to interpret otherwise would have rendered 
useless the grant of power to condemn for the stated 
statutory purposes. (P. 628, 215 P.2d). Such would 
be the result in the instant case if GSLA were denied 
power to acquire properties on Antelope Island by 
eminent domain. 
State v. Superior Court for King County, 33 Wasb 
76, 204 P.2d 514 (1949), is twice cited by the Utah 
, Court in Bertagnoli v. Baker, supra, in support of its 
position that statutes granting the power of eminent 
domain will be strictly construed. (P. 628, 215 P.2d). 
The 'Vashington Court judges the validity of the ex-
ercise of the power by determining whether said exer-
cise is expressly granted or necessarily implied from 
the statutory language. In the case cited, the Court 
said the exercise of the power was clearly invalid because 
the statute under which its validity was claimed did 
not expressly grant the power of eminent domain for 
any purpose whatsoever. 
Another case cited by appellant adopts the position 
that the power of eminent domain must be clearly and 
unequivocally given. Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City 
of Aurora, Colo., 126 Colo. 265, 248 P.2d 732 (1952). 
In this case, the municipality was attempting to con-
denm property which had been dedicated to a public 
Usp by authority of a statute which expressly granted 
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the power to condemn private property only. The Colo-
rado Court held that the attempted exercise was c011 . 
trary to the express statutory grant. 
The appellant contends that the maxims of "e,jusdem 
generis" and "e.J}pressio usius est exclusio alterius" 
nullify the express grant of the power of eminent J0. 
main to the Authority contained in Section 65-8-6(1), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in regard to the property 
on Antelope Island by excluding from the phrase "or 
other lawful means", Section 65-8-6(10), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, the right to take property by eminent 
domain. Appellant argues that the traditionally "strict 
construction" of statutes granting such power can be 
justified by application of these two maxims to lan-
guage which is an express grant of the power of eminent 
domain, when viewed in a realistic manner. The aboYe 
cases illustrate the circumstances under which courts 
properly adopt a strict construction. Consideration of 
these circumstances reveal appellant's contention to be 
without merit and the interpretation he urges to be 
contrary to the "clear implication" of the statute. 
The above discussed cases set forth a second ground 
upon which courts base adoption of a "strict constru~· 
tion" which ground appellant also heavily relies on 1l1 
support of his argument. 
The proposition is well stated in Bertagnoli v. Bakrr, 
t' tb" supra. The Utah Court held that a statute gran mg ' 
power of eminent domain should be strictly construed 
" ... so that no person will be wrongfully deprir<:rt 1'1 
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the use and enjoyment of his property." (P. 628, 215 
P.2d). 
The Court in Moyle, et al. v. Salt Lake City, III 
Utah 20 I, 176 P .2d 882 ( 1947), stated that the purpose 
of strict construction of statutes granting the power 
of eminent domain is to protect the rights of the property 
owner. 
It is widely recognized that courts view the exercise 
of the power of eminent domain as " ... fraught with 
the possibility of injustice and abuse." 18 Am. J ur., 
, Eminent Domain, Section 26. It is the fear of arbitrary 
1
: and discriminatory exercise of the power of eminent 
': domain which motivates the courts to strictly construe 
' statutes which grant this power. The courts attempt to 
J mitigate these dangers by strictly construing the statute 
! granting the power in order to limit the exercise of the 
' power as much as possible. 
So restrictive a construction is not necessary where 
the dangers are mitigated to the point of complete 
elimination by the statute itself. Title 65, Chapter 8, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, achieves the desired elimi-
nation of the injustices which the Courts fear by impos-
ing procedural safeguards upon the exercise of the. 
power of eminent domain by the Great Salt Lake 
Authority. 
Section 65-8-6 (7), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
requires that the exercise of the power of eminent domain 
0r the Great Salt Lake Authority adhere to the pro-
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cedures outlined by Title 78, Chapter 34, Utah CorL· 
Annotated, 1953. The Authority is thereby precluded 
from acquiring property by eminent domain in an arbi. 
trary or discriminatory manner. 
Section 78-34-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states 
that the Court or the judge of the Court has the power 
to determine whether or not the conditions for rnlid 
exercise of the power of eminent domain specified in 
Section 78-34-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, have been 
sa tisfi.ed. The conditions are as follows: 
"Before property can be taken it must appear: 
( 1) That the use to which it is applied is a use 
authorized by law; 
(2) 
(3) 
That the taking is necessary to such use; and 
If already appropriated to some public use, 
that the public use to which it is applied is 
a more necessary public use." Section 78· 
34-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Application of the above statutory criteria of yalid· 
ity to the actions of the Great Salt Lake Authority in 
taking property for public use places a substantial limi· 
tation on the Authority's discretion. The power of the 
Court in eminent domain proceedings constitutes a suf· 
ficient controlling element which reviews GSLA's exer· 
cise of its discretionary powers. 
In addition to the safeguards provided by Title 
78, Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Lcgis· 
· dd" · 1 l" "t t. on tli' lature has imposed an a itiona 11111 a ion , 
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Authority's power to take property for public use. 
Section 65-8-6 (I), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, re-
quires the Authority to procure the consent of the Legis-
lature before pledging the credit of the State for the 
purpose of acquiring any real or personal property. 
The exercise by the Authority of its power of eminent 
domain is subject therefore to a second review. 
A reading of Title 65, Chapter 8, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, reveals that the Legislature recognized the 
possible arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the 
' power of eminent domain and that it provided pro-
, cedural limitations which would effectively eliminate 
this possibility. Therefore, the strict construction urged 
by defendant is not justified on the bases which motivate 
to courts to adopt a strict construction. 
The interpretation of the phrase "or other lawful 
means", Section 65-8-6 (IO), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, to include the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain by the Great Salt Lake Authority in regard 
to the property on Antelope Island is consistent with 
the plain meaning of the statute, will allow the accom-
plishment of the stated legislative intent, and will do 
no violence to the policy which has previously motivated 
the courts to strictly construe statutes which delegate 
that power. 
(3) A denial to GSLA of the power to acquire 
properties on Antelope Island by eminent 
domain would grant a special immunity to 
Antelope Island, which unconstitutional re-
sult the Legislature could not have intended. 
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The appellant would have the Court adopt a statu-
tory construction which would render the property of 
Antelope Island immune to the Authority's power of 
eminent domain. 
The property on Antelope Island is clearly withi11 
the jurisdiction of the Authority's power as it is speei 
fically mentioned by the statute. Section 65-8-6 (10), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Therefore, the construc-
tion argued for by the appellant would have the effed 
of singling out a certain area of the "Great Salt Lake 
and its environs" for special privileges and immunities. 
Such a construction of the Statute would transform 
Section 65-8-6 ( 10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, into 
special legislation in violation of Article VI, Section 
26 (16), Constitution of Utah. 
The following Utah cases illustrate the manner in 
which this Court characterizes special legislation. 
A statute must operate uniformly to all within the 
jurisdiction of the statute. If a statute discriminates 
in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner, it is uncon-
stitutional. 1'ygeson v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 
274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950). 
"The mere fact that legislation is made to apply 
to certain persons and not to others does not affect its 
validity if it be so made that all persons affected by its 
terms are treated alike under like circumstances and 
conditions." Abrahamsen v. Board of Review of In-
dustrial Commission, B U.2d 289, 283 P.2d 213, 216 
(1955). 
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A statute is not special legislation as long as it is 
• uniformly applied to those subject to its terms. Entre 
· Nous Club v. '11oronto, 4 U.2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955). 
A statute must apply equally to all members within 
the class to which it applies. State v. Twitchell, 8 U.2d 
314, 333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1959). 
A law is general if it operates uniformly upon 
those things subject to its application. Conover v. Board 
of Education, 110 Utah 454, 175 P.2d 209 (1946). 
A law must operate uniformly upon all members 
: of any class of persons, places, or things in order to be 
I 
· classified as general legislation. (Emphasis added) . 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, (1939). 
If the construction of the Statute requested by 
the appellant is adopted by the Court, the Statute would 
be unconstitutional as granting special privileges and 
inununities in violation of Article VI, Section 26 ( 16), 
Constitution of Utah. 
The construction requested by appellant is, in the 
first instance, clearly violative of the stated legislative 
intent and is therefore a strained construction based 
solely upon the mechanical application of certain rules 
of statutory construction. In addition, adoption of the 
construction the appellant proposes would violate the 
principle of statutory construction that a statute is 
interpreted in favor of a finding of constitutionality. 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Section 4509, 3rd 
ed. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Patterick v. Carbon 
Water Conservancy Dist., et al., 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2il 
503 ( 1944), stated its recognition of the general accept-
ance of this principle: 
"It i~ ':"ell established that a court will uphold 
the validity of an act passed by the legislature 
wherever possible and will not declare it uncon-
stitutional unless its invalidity is apparent." (P. , 
505, 145 P.2d). 
The language of the Court in Donahue v. T¥arner 
Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2 U.2d 256, 272 , 
P.2d 177 ( 1954), is even more explicit: 
"'Vhere there is ambiguity or uncertainty with 
respect to the interpretation or application of the 
statute, and two alternatives exist, one by which 
the statute would be either unconstitutional, or 
serious doubt would exist as to its constitution· 
ality, as compared with an interpretation where· 
under the statute would be clearly constitutional, i 
the latter will be given effect." (P. 184 27? 
P.2d). 
The interpretation proposed by appellant is con· 
trary to the plain meaning of the statute. Such an inter-
pretation would require the Court to declare the Statute 
unconstitutional when any less artificial interpretation 
would raise no doubt as to the Statute's validity. 
POINT V 
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IS TO INTER-
PRET THE STATUTE, AS IS, AND NOT TO 
ENLARGE. 
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. A reading of the Statute, as is, shows that it with-
. stands appellant's arguments without enlargement by 
the Judiciary. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the Legislature in establishing the 
! Great Salt Lake Authority was to create an organiza-
tion sufficiently flexible to implement the legislative 
policy. A degree of rigidity greater than that found in 
i the procedural safeguards imposed for the protection 
of public and private interests would have made accom-
plishment of the stated purpose an impossibility. 
A consideration of the purpose hoped to be accom-
plished shows that the Legislature chose the most real-
istic definition of GSLA's jurisdiction-the lake and 
its environs within the surveyed meander line. A defi-
nition which named counties, etc., to be included within 
the jurisdiction would be needlessly confusing. 
The Legislature placed the problem of the lake's 
. development into the hands of persons whose knowledge 
i would enable them to set up a working program. The 
details of that program were necessarily left to GSLA. 
Having outlined a basic plan for implementation 
of its policy, the Legislature inserted certain standards 
. to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory action by a 
i Dody to which it had given very broad powers. These 
standards limit GSLA's discretion without destroying 
its eft'ectiveness. 
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The language of the Act gives sufficient notice 
to those who will be affected by its operation-by de-
scription of GSLA's jurisdiction-and by specific men-
tion in regard to the appellant in this appeal. 
Appellant has failed to present any basis upon 
which the Act can be held unconstitutionally invalid. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
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